ABSTRACT. Landowner resistance to Endangered
I. INTRODUCTION
Private lands in the United States are critical to the conservation of threatened and endangered (T&E) species. Approximately 85% of federally designated endangered species occur on private lands (Hanley et al. 2012; Sorice, Haider, et al. 2011; Langpap 2004; Langpap and Wu 2004) . Although the Endangered Species Act (ESA) is designed to protect T&E species from extinction, continued loss of habitat on private lands is undermining species conservation and recovery. Under the ESA, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) may mandate that landowners mitigate for habitat loss or conversion that would further imperil T&E species (Smith and Shogren 2002) . However, because the ESA applies only when land use changes require a federal permit or receive federal funds, the ESA provides incomplete protection against habitat loss .
Concurrently, the ESA has been criticized for inequitable distribution of the costs of regulatory compliance, and the creation of perverse incentives (Langpap 2004; Langpap and Wu 2004; Brook, Zint, and De Young 2003; Shogren et al. 1999) . Landowners typically receive no direct financial benefits from protecting T&E species but, rather, incur the opportunity costs of land use restrictions that prevent the conversion of land to more profitable, intensive uses (Hanley et al. 2012; Sorice, Oh, 2013; Sorice, Haider et al. 2011; Langpap 2006) . The response of some landowners is to "shoot, shovel and shut up" (Polasky 2008; Innes 2000) or to adopt the "scorched earth" technique (National Association of Homebuilders 1996; see also Brown and Shogren 1998) . In these cases, landowners covertly kill T&E species or preemptively destroy habitat to avoid regulatory penalties and land use restrictions under the ESA. Landowner resistance to the ESA is an important challenge to T&E species conservation and highlights the need for more equitable approaches that encourage landowner cooperation in species protection (Shogren et al. 1999) .
In an effort to reduce compliance costs, the ESA allows for voluntary regulatory assurances that allow landowners and the USFWS to agree on conservation actions to be implemented on private lands. In return for engaging in these conservation actions, the USFWS guarantees the landowner "will not incur additional costs or be subject to further restrictions in the future" (Langpap and Wu 2004, 436 ; see also Ruhl 1999; Langpap 2004) . Despite the availability of these assurances, continued habitat loss and associated declines in species populations suggest that additional measures are required to conserve T&E species on private lands (Kerr and Deguise 2004; Wilcove et al. 1998) .
Accordingly, government agencies have implemented voluntary conservation programs, including cost-share agreements, conservation easements, tax concessions, depredation payments, and payments for ecosystem services (PES) (Hanley et al. 2012; Langpap 2006; Sorice, Haider et al. 2011; Thornton and Quinn 2009) . Payments are typically targeted at land management actions that are intended to benefit T&E species (Hanley et al. 2012) . A key example is the trial Working Lands for Florida Panther Conservation payment to be implemented through the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Regional Conservation Partnership Program. 1 This is a voluntary program that will provide rangeland owners with a per acre payment for land stewardship that provides the endangered Florida panther (Puma concolor coryi) with habitat and a prey base. Per acre payments will be tied to specific stewardship practices (prescribed burning, removal of exotic plant species, mowing, chopping, prescribed grazing) and the installation of game cameras on enrolled lands (Florida Panther Recovery Implementation Team 2015) . 2 The program recog-1 See www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/fl/pro grams/farmbill/rcpp/.
2 The USFWS also proposed the implementation of a safe harbor agreement (SHA) in central Florida, specifically, on private rangelands that are directly north of the panther's current breeding range. The SHA would provide landowners with assurances against ESA regulation if they engage in stewardship practices that provide habitat and a prey base for the Florida panther. However, to date, focus has been placed on the payment program. nizes that lands managed by Florida cattle ranchers play a critical role in panther conservation and recovery efforts.
The program also recognizes that Florida cattle ranchers, in common with other private landowners, are conflicted about whether to support panther conservation efforts (see related research by Breck et al. 2011; Agarwala et al. 2010; Bangs et al. 2005; NaughtonTreves, Grossberg, and Treves 2003) . Cattle ranchers have criticized panther recovery efforts, expressing concerns about the role of government and about perceived threats to their cultural identity (Kreye, Pienaar, and Adams 2017; Pienaar, Kreye, and Jacobs 2015) . Their culture is deeply rooted in politically conservative beliefs about personal independence and private property rights, which is manifested in general opposition to regulations that dictate what cattle ranchers can do on their lands (i.e., control predators) and the use of tax dollars to fund government interventions on private lands (see related research by Naughton-Treves, Grossberg, and Treves 2003; Nie 2001; Montag and Patterson 2001) .
These concerns highlight the importance of appropriately designing voluntary T&E species conservation programs. It is often implicitly assumed that landowners will enroll in an incentive program if the proposed payment level offsets the costs of maintaining land in conservation, for example, stewardship costs, livestock depredation, and opportunity costs of foregone land uses (Layton and Siikamäki 2009) . However, cattle ranchers' concerns about personal autonomy provide support for the argument that government-financed conservation programs may be ineffective when program design does not match the social preferences (e.g., for personal autonomy) of the target population (Bowles and PolaniaReyes 2012) or reinforce social norms to engage in conservation (Sorice, Haider et al. 2011) . A multitude of factors influence landowners' willingness to participate in conservation programs, including property size, existing and potential land uses, land productivity, environmental attitudes and knowledge, expectations about whether future generations will continue to utilize land for agriculture, general community support for enrollment in conservation programs, level of trust in governance systems, and level of involvement in community institutions, organizations and social networks (Hanley et al. 2012; Lindhjem and Mitani 2012; Sorice, Haider et al. 2011; Horne 2006; Langpap 2004) .
Landowners' willingness to engage in voluntary conservation programs also critically depends on ease of adoption, contract duration, transaction costs, and which organization acts as the intermediary (government agency, environmental NGO, private company) (Davis et al. 2015; Hanley et al. 2012; Sorice, Oh et al. 2013; Sorice, Haider et al. 2011) . Contractual obligations that adversely impact personal autonomy reduce the likelihood that landowners will enroll in conservation programs (Sorice, Oh et al. 2013; Moon, Marshall, and Cocklin 2012; Kreuter et al. 2006; Wilcove and Lee 2004; Dan-Cohen 1992) . Lack of trust in government agencies may reinforce concerns about personal autonomy (Bowles and Polania-Reyes 2012; Moon, Marshall, and Cocklin 2012) . For example, perceived government mismanagement of T&E species has negatively affected public attitudes toward recovery efforts (Gangaas, Kaltenborn, and Andreassen 2015) . Conversely, the social embeddedness of the Blackfoot Challenge, a nonprofit partnership of private landowners, public agencies, and nonprofit organizations, helped facilitate rancher participation in voluntary conservation programs in northwestern Montana (including conservation of T&E species) (Davis et al. 2015) .
This paper extends our understanding of landowner response to incentives by examining how program design and incentive delivery mechanisms affect landowners' sense of autonomy and willingness to participate in conservation efforts. To gain insights into how a panther conservation program should be structured to increase the likelihood of enrolling Florida cattle ranchers, we implemented a stated preference survey in 2014, which targeted members of the Florida Cattlemen's Association.
Best-worst scaling (BWS) methods were used to elicit direct measures of utility for five program attributes: financial and regulatory incentives, technical assistance, the agency responsible for program implementation, contract duration, and number of acres maintained as panther habitat. The BWS method has the advantage of producing more information than traditional discrete choice methods, specifically measures of both attributelevel utility and mean utility of an attribute across all its levels. BWS also minimizes the likelihood of introducing cognitive tendencies and assumptions about human decision-making (e.g., anchoring bias associated with Likert scales; subjective use of ratings scales associated with ratings models) by having respondents consider only the extremes of the utility space (e.g., select a best and worst element from a list of attribute levels; Flynn et al. 2007; Louviere, Flynn, and Marley 2015) . This approach is preferred for its efficiency of information use (producing robust estimates with small sample sizes) and its ability to identify the relative importance of selected program attributes and levels. Our results indicate that program structure-in particular program features that relate to cultural beliefs, personal autonomy, and trust in government-plays a key role in cattle ranchers' willingness to engage in panther conservation.
II. EMPIRICAL APPROACH
We propose that cattle ranchers' decision to enroll in a panther conservation program is a function of (1) whether the incentives offered offset the costs of conservation, and (2) the degree to which program structure impacts personal autonomy (Lancaster 1966 ). We build on previous studies (e.g., Sorice, Oh et al. 2013; Bowles and Polania-Reyes 2012; Moon, Marshall, and Cocklin 2012) by recognizing the importance of nonfinancial motivations in determining private landowners' willingness to enroll in conservation programs. We further build on previous economic studies of landowner preferences for conservation programs, which utilized a stated preference choice experiment framework (e.g., Sorice, Haider et al. 2011; Sorice, Oh et al. 2013; Horne 2006) , by incorporating BWS into the choice model.
The BWS method, used in this study, was first implemented in the field of marketing in the 1990s (Finn and Louviere 1992) to assess consumer preferences for goods and services, for example, beef products and health care (Coast et al. 2006; Flynn et al. 2007; Lusk and Parker 2009 ). More recently, BWS has been used to assess stakeholder preferences related to environmental policy (Dorow et al. 2009; Scarpa et al. 2011; Loureiro and Arcos 2012; Greiner, Bliemer, and Ballweg 2014; Rudd and Fleishman 2014; Louviere, Flynn, and Marley 2015; Soto, Adams, and Escobedo 2016) . We extend this emerging literature by applying BWS to the conservation of T&E species on private agricultural lands, with specific focus on the design of voluntary programs to conserve panther habitat on Florida rangelands.
BWS is an innovative ranking procedure, rooted in random utility theory, that allows the researcher to directly measure the utility that landowners derive from conservation program attributes (Louviere, Flynn, and Marley 2015) . Similar to classical rating scale methods (e.g., respond on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being "not at all important" and 5 being "very important"), BWS tasks (e.g., select a best and a worst element from a list) elicit direct measures of utility associated with attribute levels (Louviere and Islam 2008) . As such, BWS improves on indirect approaches, such as discrete choice experimentation (DCE) or dichotomous choice (DC) methodologies, that infer utility by analyzing choice outcomes (e.g., choice among several attribute level profiles; acceptance/rejection of an entire profile) (Louviere, Hensher, and Swait 2000; Louviere and Islam 2008) .
There are several other key advantages of BWS over ratings, Likert scales, DC, and DCE. Models that use ratings fail to account for the notion that different people are likely to use the same scale differently, limiting the interpretation of ratings to an ordinal scale at best (Lusk and Briggeman 2009) . Likert scales introduce cognitive tendencies such as anchoring bias (the tendency of a given respondent to place all items near either the center or extremes of a rating scale) and survey inattentiveness (the tendency of respondents to rate all items identically; Auger, Devinney, and Louviere 2007) . In the case of DCE, the "choose one profile" task is relatively inefficient; that is, more attribute profiles are needed to elicit preference information (Flynn et al. 2007 ). Furthermore, DCE and DC models confound the importance or weight of an attribute with the underlying latent measurement scale. When using DCE or DC, one has to exercise caution when making interdimensional utility comparisons (Louviere, Flynn, and Marley 2015) . Given these confounding effects, DCE and DC measurements cannot separate attribute "impact" (mean utility of an attribute across all its levels on a latent, or unobserved, utility scale) and "level-scale values" (LSV) (utility of an attribute level, namely, deviations from mean utility) (Flynn et al. 2007; Louviere, Flynn, and Marley 2015) . Perhaps not surprisingly, several studies have compared BWS to DC and DCE and found "low" or "poor" correlations among models (Louviere and Islam 2008; Potoglou et al. 2011; Severin et al. 2013; Whitty et al. 2014) .
Through the use of effects coding, BWS separates attribute impacts and LSVs, which can help highlight the relative importance of key programmatic features and inform program design (Soto, Adams, and Escobedo 2016) . This separation ability is particularly important for policymakers who can then accurately state, for example, that "payments per acre are the most preferred institutional component, but on average, contract duration, as a whole, has a higher impact on program participation." This is of key importance when investigating how a conservation program should be designed to increase landowner participation. Finally, when sample size is expected to be low, the best-worst response format provides a distinct advantage over a single response format by reducing the number of choice tasks required to obtain the same number of observations (Lancsar et al. 2013) . In short, BWS offers the advantage of producing more information than DCE and DC (i.e., attribute impact and LSV), while minimizing the likelihood of introducing cognitive tendencies and assumptions about human decision-making (e.g., anchoring bias, survey inattentiveness, subjective use of ratings scales) by having respondents consider only the extremes of the utility space (Flynn et al. 2007; Louviere, Flynn, and Marley 2015) .
The BWS choice task can be estimated in four principal ways: paired or marginal estimations at the respondent or sample level (Flynn et al. 2007; Louviere, Flynn, and Marley 2015) . Marginal estimations treat each attribute level as an outcome (aggregating pairs to derive marginal best-worst frequencies) (Flynn et al. 2008) . Paired estimations (sometimes called "maxdiff") treat each unique best-worst pair as an outcome (Flynn et al. 2007) . Marginal estimations are approximations of paired methods, and both can be estimated at the sample or respondent level (Louviere, Flynn, and Marley 2015) . Respondent-level analysis takes into account heterogeneity across individuals (Louviere, Flynn, and Marley 2015) . Given that marginal methods are an approximation to paired estimations, we opted for paired estimation at the respondent level and limit our focus to that approach.
The paired estimation of BWS (at the respondent level) is typically conducted using a multinomial logit (MNL) approach (e.g., Flynn et al. 2007; Lusk and Parker 2009; Louviere, Flynn, and Marley 2015) . In our particular application, for each conservation program (choice set), the respondents were presented with a list of program attributes and asked to select which attribute level they prefer most and which they prefer least. The cognitive process involves three stages: (1) the respondent identifies every possible pair of items available in a given choice set (i.e., profile of attributes); (2) the respondent then calculates the difference in utility between each pair of items (i.e., attribute levels); and (3) the respondent chooses the pair of items that maximizes the utility difference (Flynn et al. 2007) . The number of possible pairs per choice set equals J(J − 1), where J is number of items in each choice set. Following Lusk and Briggeman (2009) , if (j,k) are a pair of items and j is chosen as best and k chosen as worst, then ( represents the location of λ λ ) j k value j(k) on the underlying scale of utility. The true or latent unobserved level of utility for individual i is given by ,
where is a random error term. The proba-ε ij bility that individual i chooses items j and k as the most and least preferred pair, respectively, from a choice set of J items is equal to the probability that the difference in I ij and I ik exceeds the difference between all other J(J − 1) − 1 possible pair combinations in the given choice set; in other words, , where l and m are Pr
all other possible pair combinations. Assuming independently and identically distributed type I extreme value errors, a MNL estimation procedure can be applied, whereby
Pr(j chosen as best, k chosen as worst)
[1]
Based on the above probability statement, standard maximum likelihood techniques can be used to estimate the utility parameters .
λ j The logistical estimation is therefore conditioned to the J(J − 1) possible pair combinations. The dependent variable takes a value of 1 for the chosen pair of best and worst values and 0 for all other J(J − 1) − 1 pairs available in the given choice set. The parameter es-λ j timates represent the location of item j relative to another item that is omitted to prevent the dummy variable trap and normalized to zero. The normalized item therefore serves as the reference point for the BWS underlying scale of utility. Namely, all estimates have the same units (i.e., underlying scale of utility), which allows for the direct estimation of attribute impacts and LSV centered around the reference point.
A key limitation of MNL models stems from assuming that all individuals in the sample place the same level of preference on each value. We relax this assumption using a mixed logit model (also referred to in the literature as random parameters logit; e.g., Lusk and Briggeman 2009 These parameter assumptions and distributional specifications were selected following the conventional implementation of mixed logit BWS (e.g., Lusk and Briggeman 2009; Potoglou et al. 2011; Louviere, Flynn, and Marley 2015) . The model is estimated via simulation following Train (2002) . Interpretations of the sign and magnitude of parameter estimates are relative to the reference point. If the coefficient value of an attribute impact variable is twice that of another, then we can interpret the result as meaning the first attribute has twice as much impact on the underlying scale of utility as the other attribute.
III. DATA COLLECTION Survey Design
A multistage survey design and implementation method was used to develop, test, validate, and distribute a survey to Florida cattle ranchers (Dillman, Smyth, and Melani 2011) . We used purposive and snowball sampling methods to connect with important members of the cattle rancher community. We conducted in-depth interviews and focus group meetings to help develop survey questions.
During survey development we identified 20 items describing important features of a conservation program: financial and regulatory incentives, technical assistance, the agency responsible for program implementation, contract duration (years), and percentage of acres maintained as panther habitat (Table  1) . As instructed by Louviere, Flynn, and Marley (2015) , an orthogonal main effects plan was used to arrange these items into 16 choice sets with five factors and four levels, following Street, Burgess, and Louviere (2005) . Orthogonal arrays are widely used for estimating linear main effects and interactions among a group of effects (in this case, program attributes). To reduce respondent fatigue, a blocking procedure was used to create two survey versions, each containing eight choice sets. 3 Appendix A includes an example best-worst choice experiment question.
Financial and regulatory incentives: Respondents were offered an annual payment that ranged from $5/acre to $30/acre for maintaining rangelands as grazing land and wildlife habitat. 4 A one-time reduction in the marginal estate tax rate (2% to 5%) was included because cattle ranchers reported that they are often compelled to sell portions of their land to developers to pay the tax, which can lead to increased habitat fragmentation. Depredation payments were offered as a means to offset the costs of livestock depredation. Respondents were offered the market value of a percentage (1% to 4%) of the annual calf crop. Respondents were presented with a single payment level for each financial incentive (see Appendix A). Payment amounts were specified as part of the incentive type attribute and were assumed to only serve the purpose of anchoring the latter with realistic compensations. 5 Finally, a regulatory assurance in the form of a habitat-based safe harbor agreement (SHA) was included as an alternative to financial incentives.
Technical assistance: Interviews with Florida cattle ranchers revealed that offers of voluntary technical assistance programs are often well received by them. One reason for this preference is that cattle ranchers have the "freedom to choose" whether to use the recommended practices, which reinforces personal autonomy. To prevent overlap with existing USDA programs, the technical 4 This incentive was selected to mimic the proposed panther PES program, without mandating specific land management practices. 5 The choice experiments presented in our survey combined the BWS and DC methods, such that respondents were asked to choose both their most and least preferred program attributes and to state whether they would enroll in the program. In order to estimate the monetary value of program attributes during the DC analysis (presented in a separate paper), it was necessary to include bid levels for each of the incentive types (with the exception of the SHA, which was a binary variable). However, including payment levels and incentive types separately in the choice questions would substantially increase the number of questions required to maintain adequate D-efficiency, thereby prohibitively increasing the length of the survey instrument. During pretests of the survey it became apparent that the cattle rancher community, which is already heavily surveyed, would refuse to answer long questionnaires. Follow-up questions during pretests also showed that ranchers were primarily focused on the incentive type and whether they would directly benefit from that incentive. In all cases, the payment level was reported to be a secondary consideration. assistance attributes included advice about improved land stewardship practices, improved game management, and securing water resources, as well as assistance with identifying other incentive programs for which cattle ranchers may be eligible.
Monitoring agency: During interviews and focus group meetings with cattle ranchers, we found that they have a particularly low level of trust in wildlife agencies, especially the USFWS, owing to negative interactions in the past and disagreements about panther management. However, their prior familiarity with USDA programs made them more trusting of the USDA. To determine how type of monitoring agency, and trust in the agency, affected cattle ranchers' willingness to enroll in a panther conservation program, we included the following four agencies in the choice experiments: the USFWS, the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWC), the USDA, and an independent environmental consultant.
Acres enrolled: Attributes describing acres enrolled ranged from 25% to 100% of eligible acres, where eligible acres were described as "lands used for cattle grazing or wildlife habitat (including habitat for the Florida panther)."
Contract duration: The length of contract commitment ranged from 5 to 30 years, which is consistent with USDA programs. Although environmental organizations typically favor conservation in perpetuity, interviews with cattle ranchers indicated that they have mixed views on contract duration. On the one hand, longer programs allow for larger total payments, although the net present value of these payments would depend on the cattle ranchers' personal discount rates. On the other hand, they expressed an unwillingness to lock the next generation into a conservation program, especially if these generations preferred converting the land to other uses.
Survey Implementation and Response
There are a considerable number of livestock operations in Florida (21,000) containing over 1.7 million head of cattle. However, only 60% of these operations are large enough ( > 20 head of cattle) to be applicable in the context of this study (USDA 2014). 6 Accordingly, we focused our data collection efforts on cattle ranchers with medium to large operations. To connect with this population we conducted data collection through the Florida Cattlemen's Association (FCA), which has approximately 3,500 members. Out of concern for their members' privacy, the FCA would not share their mailing list with us but was willing to mail the survey out to its members. Survey packets were sent to 3,297 addresses on the FCA mailing list. A total of 267 surveys were returned, of which 187 correctly completed the BWS questions.
Although this response rate is less than optimal, related studies have found politically sensitive surveys tend to receive fewer responses, especially when survey recipients tend to be older men 7 (Curtin, Presser, and Singer 2000; Goyder 1986; Moore and Tarnai 2002; Singer, Hoewyk, and Maher 2000) . Postsurvey interviews revealed that some individuals who received the anonymous survey refused to respond out of concern that their answers could be used by government agencies to identify them and impose ESA regulations on their lands or operations. In addition, we were unable to determine how many ranch operations received multiple copies of the survey because more than one member of that operation belongs to the FCA or the owner is a member of the FCA mailing list for multiple counties. We were also unable to verify if the survey recipient was actively involved in ranching. We became aware of sampling issues based on phone calls and emails from survey recipients, and follow-up discussions with the FCA. Based on the number of reports ( > 30) received by phone and email, we estimate an 11% sample error associated with the FCA mailing list and adjusted the size of the target population to 2,935. From this we estimate a 9% response rate and consider the number of completed surveys to be a marginally acceptable sample size (95% confidence interval, 7% margin of error).
As a test for nonresponse bias, we compared responses from the first and last 75 respondents (Armstrong and Overton 1977) . We found no differences between these two groups with regard to key demographic variables (ranch operation size, annual household income, percentage of income from beef, and percentage who reported that panthers use their lands; v 2 (4) = 2.09 (p > 0.05). This suggests that our survey sample was likely representative of the target population with regard to the extrinsic factors that could motivate willingness to accept behaviors.
IV. DATA ANALYSIS
A total of 1,488 choice sets were completed by the 187 respondents. Because each respondent was presented with 8 of the 16 possible choice sets, the aggregated number of completed choice experiments (all 16 choice sets) was 93. Following Louviere, Flynn, and Marley (2015) , effects coding procedures (i.e., 1 = best, -1 = worst, 0 = not selected) were applied to the data before analysis. Effects coding is mean centered, which allows for the separation of LSVs and attribute impacts (Flynn et al. 2007 (Flynn et al. , 2008 . The model was fitted to data containing 29,760 observations of potential best-worst pairs, that is, the number of all possible best-worst pair combinations in each choice set (20) multiplied by the number of choice sets in the experiment (16), multiplied by the number of completed choice sets (93).
We utilized a paired estimation approach to data analysis (refer to Section II for the rationale for using this approach). Paired estimations were analyzed using a mixed logit model to relax the assumption that all individuals in the sample place the same level of preference on each value (Lusk and Briggeman 2009; Louviere, Flynn, and Marley 2015; Soto, Adams, and Escobedo 2016) . There were J(J − 1) = 20 available best-worst pairs per choice set, and the dependent variable took a value of 1 for the chosen pair and 0 for the all other (nonchosen) pairs. Attribute impact variables took a value of 1 if the attribute (corresponding to the chosen attribute level) was chosen as "best," − 1 if "worst," and 0 otherwise. Similarly, LSV variables took the typical effects coding values (see Appendix B) if the attribute level was chosen as "best" or "worst." Note that effects coding embeds one level (as − 1; Appendix B), which is later recovered post hoc by calculating the negative sum of the estimated coefficients for each of the other variables.
The equation below, adopted from Flynn et al. (2008) , details the final model specification: Table 1 for detailed attribute descriptions and codes). The attribute impact variable Contract duration was omitted to avoid the dummy variable trap and to serve as the reference case (normalized at 0) for comparing all other attribute impact variables and LSVs. Coefficients with progressively higher values are associated with higher levels of utility. To compare preference differences among groups of respondents, we used data filtering and chi-square and Pearson's correlation analyses. In addition to the above paired estimation, we also provide descriptive statistics for the most preferred and least preferred attributes (e.g., Louviere and Islam 2008; Loureiro and Arcos 2012; Louviere, Flynn, and Marley 2015) . These are frequency counts of most preferred, least preferred, most minus least, and standard scores ([most preferred-least preferred]/N), where N is the number of completed choice sets; see Goodman, Lockshin, and Cohen 2005) .
V. RESULTS

Sociodemographic Characteristics of Respondents
Over 40% of respondents owned or managed rangelands within the Florida panther's existing range ( Table 2 ). The majority of survey respondents were male (77%), Caucasian (86%), and over the age of 50 (76%). In total, 59% of respondents reported an annual household income of $75,000 or higher, and almost 47% of respondents had earned at least a bachelor's degree. Most respondents (76%) reported that they own or lease the land that they use for cattle grazing. Over half of respondents reported a ranch operation size of more than 500 acres, and almost 30% of respondents owned more than 250 head of cattle. In total, 44% of respondents earned 25% (or less) of their income from beef production. These respondents also spent more money annually on stewardship activities (mean payment of $34.16 per acre, standard deviation of $55.24) compared to respondents who received over 26% of their income from beef production (mean of $10.35 per acre, standard deviation of $15.69).
Preferences for Panther Conservation Program Attributes
Descriptive statistics (counts) revealed that attribute levels associated with technical assistance and incentives were selected more frequently as "most preferred." However, attributes describing incentives had a higher standard error compared to technical assistance options (Table 3) . Estimation of the BWS model demonstrated that all attribute impact variables and most LSVs were significant at either the 1% or 5% level (Table 4) . Attribute impact estimates indicate that technical assistance provided the highest utility (mean across all attribute levels), followed by incentives, percentage of eligible acres enrolled, monitoring agency, and contract duration (in descending levels of utility; the latter omitted and used as a reference point).
Only two LSVs for technical assistance were significantly different from zero, indicating that during the choice experiment, respondents frequently selected technical assistance attributes as "most preferred," but the selection among levels was not always systematic. With regard to the attribute incentive types, the per acre payment for habitat conservation provided the highest level of utility, followed by a reduction in the estate tax, depredation payments, and the SHA, in descending levels of utility. All LSVs describing percentage of acres enrolled were significant, and utility increased as the percentage of acres enrolled increased. Program monitoring by USFWS was significant and was associated with a lower level of utility relative to other monitoring agencies. Contract duration had the lowest attribute impact on choice behaviors, but all LSVs were significant and utility decreased as length of contract increased.
Respondents in the central region of Florida (the panther's expansion range) derived more utility from financial and regulatory incentives. In contrast, respondents in the south- ern region (the panther's breeding range, in which landowners are required to mitigate for habitat loss) focused more on the percentage of acres enrolled and monitoring agency (v 2 (4, N = 69) = 1.16, p < 0.05) (Figure 1) . Mean utility for all program attributes (attribute impact) was higher for respondents who earned less than $50,000 in annual household income compared to those who earned over $100,000 annually (v 2 (4, N = 67) = 11.62, p < 0.01) (Figure 2) . Likewise, utility derived from technical assistance, incentives, and percentage of acres enrolled was higher for respondents who received less than 25% of their income from livestock production, compared to those who received more than 50% of their income from livestock (v 2 (4, N = 79) = 5.08, p < 0.01).
VI. DISCUSSION
Based on our relatively small sample size we suspect that the cattle ranchers who responded to the survey tended have strong opinions about the management of panthers on private lands. Qualitative analysis of the numerous comments left by cattle ranchers at the end of the survey revealed negative attitudes toward panther recovery efforts and concerns about the potential economic impact of panther recovery efforts on ranching (Kreye, Pienaar, and Adams 2017) . A comparison of our findings with the ranch operations reported in the 2012 U.S. Agricultural Census (USDA 2014) further revealed that cattle ranchers with larger operations (i.e., > 500 head of cattle) and those in the panther breeding area and expansion range were disproportionally represented in the final dataset. This outcome was not unexpected, as the survey was sent to members of the FCA and a second round of surveys was sent to addresses in the southern region. While sample bias is often a concern, we do not consider this particular overrepresentation in our sample to be a hindrance to drawing policy inferences from data analysis. The population that was sampled are the target participants for a panther conservation program. As such, we consider our findings useful for informing the better marketing and design of programs for landowners who have strong opinions about conservation efforts and/or have lands critical to panther recovery efforts. It is notable that the program feature that generated the highest level of utility-technical assistance-was unrelated to income or regulatory assurances. This is consistent with findings by Wilcove and Lee (2004) that technical assistance may be more important than either regulatory assurances or financial assistance in securing the cooperation of landowners in conservation programs. We posit that respondents used the technical assistance attributes to express their cultural values about personal autonomy (specifically, maintaining private landowner rights and resisting government interference), rather than a preference for a particular type of technical assistance program (see also Jacobson 2002) . Nonetheless, some respondents may have derived highest utility from technical assistance because of anticipated outcomes (e.g., improved hunting opportunities from better game management, improved habitat quality, and greater knowledge of the range of incentive programs available to them).
Per acre payments for habitat conservation and a reduction in estate taxes were also highly preferred as program attributes. Respondents likely perceived these payment vehicles to be most effective in offsetting both economic pressures to convert rangelands to other uses and the costs of panther conservation. As presented in the survey, direct payments offered a consistent source of income (annual per acre payments) that were directly linked to acres of conserved habitat, rather than specific land management practices. The preference for a reduction in the estate tax appears to be in line with cattle ranchers' values about the appropriate role of government (Langpap 2006; Sorice, Haider et al. 2011; Sorice, Oh et al. 2013; Stainback and Alavalapati 2002) . Cattle ranchers who provided comments on the survey expressed opposition toward the collection of taxes to fund government programs that increase financial burdens for landowners.
Depredation payments, which are frequently suggested by environmental organizations as a source of compensation for living with predators, typically require independent verification of the kill by an agency, a source of real conflict for cattle ranchers. Accordingly, we presented them with a depredation payment that would only require them to report their livestock herd sizes and would obviate any need to identify and verify the source of predation. Despite this attempt to reduce compliance costs, the depredation payment generated lower levels of utility than either the habitat payment or the reduction in the estate tax. This finding is consistent with the literature that documents the limitations of depredation compensation programs in improving livestock owners' tolerance for predators, encouraging landowner support for predator conservation, and reducing conflicts between ranchers and wildlife management agencies (Breck et al. 2011; Agarwala et al. 2010; Bangs et al. 2005; Naughton-Treves, Grossberg, and Treves 2003) .
The SHA option was least preferred by cattle ranchers, even though it was intended to help prevent possible future panther-related regulation under the ESA. This is contrary to findings that, in the presence of uncertainty about future regulation and conservation benefits, landowners require regulatory assurances to engage in conservation of T&E species (Langpap and Wu 2004 ; see also Sorice, Haider et al. 2011; Wilcove and Lee 2004) . Based on survey comments, respondents considered a SHA to be safe harbor for panthers, rather than safe harbor against regulation, even though the SHA was explained in the survey. A SHA would also require an intensive biological survey of enrolled lands, to establish a baseline from which to measure changes in habitat conditions. During followup interviews to the survey, cattle ranchers expressed very strong concerns about having their land inventoried for a SHA, especially by an agency that they do not trust. Our findings are consistent with the argument that social capital and trust are of equal or greater importance than incentives when engaging landowners in T&E conservation programs (Knobloch and Cawley 2005; Pretty and Smith 2004) .
In general, cattle ranchers who were willing to enter a program preferred to enroll a higher percentage of eligible acres. This is reasonable, as the proposed programs did not require them to implement additional management activities, but rather to maintain enrolled lands in current uses. In a similar study, when landowners were required to make land use changes, contracts with lower percentage of acres enrolled were preferred, as these programs were perceived to reduce opportunity costs of enrollment (Layton and Siikamäki 2009) .
Contract duration had the least attribute impact on choice behaviors relative to all other program features. Consistent with other studies, cattle ranchers preferred programs with a shorter contract duration (e.g., Hanley et al. 2012; Layton and Siikamäki 2009) . In all likelihood, this reflects concerns about the opportunity costs of enrolling in a program, and values about maintaining personal autonomy (e.g., Sorice, Oh et al. 2013) .
Monitoring organization had an important impact on choice behaviors, which was reinforced by discussions with cattle ranchers about the role of government, and which agencies could be trusted to implement a conservation program. There was a clear negative bias against working with the USFWS, and this likely reflects the history of conflict between the USFWS and cattle ranchers regarding the management of the panther and other T&E species. Interviews with cattle ranchers and survey comments confirmed cattle ranchers' distrust of the USFWS, based on the perception that wildlife agencies do not treat ranchers fairly and are less skilled in land stewardship than ranchers (Kreye, Pienaar, and Adams 2017; Pienaar, Kreye, and Jacobs 2015) . There is also a pervasive distrust of agency biologists who come from other states and are not considered part of Florida's culture.
Cattle ranchers who have operations within the panther's current breeding range differed in their preferences, compared to cattle ranchers in the expansion range. Those in the breeding range placed greater importance on program features that impact personal autonomy, in particular the agency responsible for monitoring the conservation program. Incentive type was of comparatively less importance despite the fact that these ranchers bear higher costs from panther conservation (i.e., livestock depredation and mitigation under the ESA). Related studies have found that landowners may place more importance on individualism and independence over benefits that are jointly obtained with other landowners, and that landowner response to government interventions is often linked with trust in government (Emery 2015; Habron 2003; Tyler 2003) . Cattle ranchers in the panther's breeding range have been highly critical of wildlife agency efforts to conserve and recover the panther. A significant number of survey comments claimed that past government actions (such as panther population counts and the use of genetic introgression to recover the panther) are biased against cattle ranchers, inaccurate, or inappropriate.
There was also evidence that size of operation and income influenced the choice behaviors of cattle ranchers. We found a negative correlation between utility for all program features and annual household income and ranch size. Individuals with smaller herd sizes likely experience proportionally higher costs associated with livestock depredation (as a percentage of total livestock income) compared to larger ranch operations (see also Rosas-Rosas, Bender, and Valdez 2008) .
Economies of scale relationships between agricultural activities, income, and perceived risk associated with predators are not uncommon (Bjerke, Reitan, and Kellert 1998; Kaltenborn, Bjerke, and Vittersø 1999; Langpap 2004 Langpap , 2006 Matta, Alavalapati, and Mercer 2009) . This does, however, have implications for program design and effectiveness. If larger landowners with more available habitat derive less relative utility from conservation programs, regardless of design, then conservation programs may not enroll high-priority landowners.
Our results were derived using well-accepted methods, but despite the many advantages of using BWS, the approach has some limitations that merit discussion and further research to guide future applications. One limitation, which is of particular importance to applied economists, stems from its inability to produce data completely consistent with unconditional demand theory (e.g., willingnessto-accept/pay; Flynn et al. 2007 ). BWS produces conditional demand information, whereas DCE and DC, by offering a status quo option (e.g., option to reject all choices; accept/reject), produces unconditional demand information. Flynn et al. (2007) have proposed adding a second task to BWS, an accept/reject option, to take advantage of the benefits of BWS, while producing "traditional" DCE estimates. This proposed hybrid BWS/binary choice task is a fertile area for future empirical and theoretical research.
Another limitation relates to the use of a commonly reported statistics on model goodness of fit. Given the assumptions of BWS (e.g., iid type 1 extreme distribution), we were able to use the familiar logistic specification (typically used in DCE applications) to generate parameter estimates and generally reported global statistics, including McFadden's likelihood ratio index (LRI). However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no theoretical or applied (e.g., simulation study) guidance for the clear interpretation of the McFadden's LRI estimate provided in Table 4 or in similar BWS studies (e.g., Lusk and Parker 2009; Campbell and Erdem 2015; Lusk and Briggeman 2009 ).
In addition, since preference elicitation format is known to affect value estimates (e.g., Kreye, Adams, and Escobedo 2014), future work is needed to understand how BWS-derived estimates compare to alternative approaches (e.g., using split sample designs), particularly traditional discrete choice experimentation. In this context, it will be important to assess methods for managing and calibrating for hypothetical bias (e.g., confidence or certainty scales in BWS ratings, cognitive dissonance minimization, cheap talk) and consequentiality (i.e., the effects of survey language stating the potential uses of responses), which remain significant concerns and important questions for future research.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Although we would caution against interpreting the results of our study as representative of the Florida cattle rancher community (given the low response rate), we note that cattle ranchers who are included in this study represent the population that would most likely be targeted for a panther conservation program. Cattle ranchers who responded to the survey had strong opinions about panther conservation, which is useful for informing the marketing and design of conservation programs for politically conservative landowners whose lands are important to recovery efforts. We would caution against using these findings to project program enrollment or describe the preferences of the broader population of cattle ranchers in Florida regarding panther recovery efforts. Nonetheless, our findings provide insights into the importance of considering program design when implementing programs to attain conservation behaviors on private lands.
Using a BWS experiment survey-a relatively novel stated preference method-we found that the utility that respondents derive from conservation incentive programs depends on both incentives offered and program features that impact cultural values and perceptions of personal autonomy. We found that cattle ranchers who have been most adversely affected by Florida panther conservation placed higher relative importance on which agency would implement and monitor a conservation program, and the amount of land that would be committed to panther conservation. Beliefs about the role of government; distrust of the USFWS, other wildlife agencies, and environmental groups; and personal autonomy tended to take precedence over purely financial concerns. The use of BWS in this context provides a useful contribution to the literature and demonstrates the utility of the method.
Our findings suggest that care should be taken when designing voluntary conservation incentive programs for landowners who are resistant toward government programs and T&E species recovery efforts on private lands. Contractual arrangements should clearly link incentives with ecosystem service indicators that require minimal agency monitoring, and that landowners may easily produce. In the case of the Florida panther, acres of habitat conserved is a sensible metric, especially given the wide-ranging nature of the panther, the use of multiple habitat types by the panther, and the inherent difficulty in documenting panther presence without the use of radio telemetry data.
Interviews with various stakeholder groups and a perusal of comments on panther conservation show that environmental organizations generally advocate for a high level of monitoring to prevent "double dipping" by landowners, and to ensure that finances are clearly assigned to panther recovery. While we agree that care must be taken in contract design to prevent moral hazard, our findings highlight the fact that the level of contract obligation (in terms of monitoring) and contract complexity (in terms of demonstrating conservation output) will likely directly affect cattle ranchers' willingness to engage in panther conservation. Designing a program that satisfies environmental interests but offends the cultural and personal beliefs of cattle ranchers will likely ensure program failure by entrenching rancher-agency conflicts and rancher-panther conflicts. Linking incentives with habitat conservation (rather than panther conservation) may also provide a cognitive degree of separation from species recovery efforts, which may be more appealing to landowners who are critical about how species recovery efforts are being conducted.
Avoiding the unnecessary collection of sensitive information may help address landowner concerns about future regulation or the misuse of information by agencies. Florida cattle ranchers are particularly concerned about sharing information about herd sizes, calf crops, and the presence of T&E species on their land. Programs that require cattle ranchers to trust that certain benefits will be realized in the future (e.g., regulatory assurances) may be less successful. Reframing programs in terms of a fair exchange in the present is more likely to elicit cooperation. Norms of reciprocity are also more likely to engage cattle ranchers in conservation efforts (Cook, Hardin, and Levi 2005; Raymond 2006 ). However, implementing a conservation program through a trusted organization (typically not a wildlife agency) is most likely to be effective.
There is a fine balance between contract structure and short-and long-term conservation outcomes. Efficient policy designwhich cannot feasibly be implemented by government agencies-requires the creation of incentives that vary across space to account for both the opportunity costs of conservation and spatially varying ecological benefit functions (Hanley et al. 2012) . If instead, focus is placed on attaining landscape-level conservation, then voluntary conservation programs must attract a critical level of landowner participation in order to create a connected mosaic of conservation benefits (Sorice, Oh et al. 2013) . Conservation contracts with extensive management requirements, verification procedures, and long periods of landowner commitment are generally more effective in securing high-quality habitat into the future but are likely to be characterized by low levels of enrollment. We do not argue that our suggestions will result in the optimal levels of conservation in all cases. However, in common with other studies (Sorice, Oh et al. 2013; Horne 2006; Langpap 2004 ), we would contend that the continued use of approaches that undermine the willingness of landowners to cooperate in conservation efforts are of limited effectiveness. From a purely pragmatic point of view, the conservation community should consider offering programs that better balance the cultural and political values of landowners with the conservation needs of the public. 
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